The Twins – Postseason and Beyond

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After a surprisingly successful 94-win season in 2010, the Minnesota Twins will be facing their nemesis and mine, the New York Yankees, in the AL Division Series in two days. Just as sportswriters have to vote on player awards before the postseason begins, I should memorialize my thoughts on the state of the Twins as they conclude this campaign and transition into the future.

First, an admission of error. I pronounced in June that the Twins would go “as far as Justin Morneau takes them.” As it happened, Morneau, enjoying the best year of his career, suffered a concussion before the All-Star Game and never played again, yet the Twins played their best ball without him. On the other hand, I also identified Jon Rauch as, at best, a stopgap closer. The Twins apparently agreed, for they picked up Brian Fuentes and Matt Capps and relegated Rauch to 7th-inning duty.

Strengths and Weaknesses. The Twins’ strengths are 1) relief pitching, 2) depth of starting pitching, 3) team defense, and 4) a balanced offense. What they lack: 1) a #1 starter, 2) home run power, 3) speed, and 4) depth at catcher and in the outfield. Losing Joe Nathan for the year was a blow, but it spurred the Twins to add personnel that resulted in a stronger bullpen than if Nathan were still around. Randy Flores was a complete bust, and we need never hear his name again. But Matt Capps, acquired from Washington, seems the equal of Nathan, and he is several years younger. The real coup, however, was then adding Brian Fuentes (why did the Angels let him go? Why did the White Sox miss him on waivers?). Not only is he an experienced closer who is lefthanded and can shut teams down in the 8th inning, his presence freed up Matt Guerrier and Jesse Crain for the 7th or earlier, where they seem to be more effective. Throw in Jose Mijares, who can be unhittable for lefthanded batters when he isn’t wild and Gardy has all the pieces for the relief ballet he likes to dance.

There is a certain sameness to Blackburn, Baker and Slowey, all young righthanded middle-of-the-rotation type guys, who can be alternately lights-out or bombed. I love watching them when they’re on, but whether we’ll ever see more than a 15-win year from any of them is an open question. Carl Pavano was the Twins’ ace this year, and despite some subpar outings in September, he is the best bet to hold the Yankees to two runs when he pitches. Whether that will produce a win is the issue. Liriano has a devastating slider, and when he can spot his fastball he is a strikeout machine. He is, however, erratic and more prone to emotion than the righthanders, and I don’t like his chances against C.C.Sabathia, even at home. Brian Duensing has done remarkably well, given his lack of pedigree and experience, and if he continues to improve can be a cornerstone for years to come. You will note that these names add up to six, and since a team generally needs only five starters, that means one will sit out – for the ALDS it seems to be Baker, an erstwhile Opening Day starter. Also in the wings is Glen Perkins, who has been an effective starter in the past and is still young. Does that mean the Twins needn’t resign free agent Pavano, or should trade a starter for a more pressing need, like an outfielder, or backup catcher? Given the fact that someone is always hurt, it may be more necessity than luxury to have someone in reserve. But if Pavano demands a long-term deal, or someone offers something good for Perkins, I would let them go.

Defense has been a hallmark of the Twins in recent years, and for most of this year the Twins had a ridiculously low number of errors. All the same, there are no obvious Gold Glovers on the team (if Mauer wins one, it will be for his hitting), Cuddyer was merely an adequate replacement for Morneau at first, Young is well below average in leftfield and Kubel is competent but not fast in right. If Morneau comes back next year, Cuddyer can return to right, which leaves left as the problem spot. If the Twins can add one player for next year, it should be a speedy leftfielder, who can occasionally spell Span in center. That would allow Young and Kubel to form a powerful left-right DH tandem and allow them to give Span, Cuddyer and even Morneau the occasional rest they could have used this season.

The infield epitomizes the Twins’ offensive balance, now that rookie Danny Valencia is a fixture at third (what an arm!). Hudson, Valencia and, to a lesser degree, Hardy, Punto and Casilla all contributed big games without overpowering anyone. What will become of the middle infield next year? I was frankly surprised that both Hudson and Hardy worked out as well as they did, but I’m not sure Hardy did enough to lay any longterm claim to the shortstop position. If Casilla were slightly less flashy, I would take him over Hardy. I would certainly rather have him at bat in the 9th inning with the game on the line. Trevor Plouffe seems to be rising through the minors. If he is the answer at short, then Casilla can play second, with Punto in his usual super-reserve role and the Twins would have an exciting, affordable infield for several years to come.

I’ve addressed outfield depth above – Jason Repko has been a fine fill-in, but is offensively challenged – which leaves the gap at backup catcher. Joe Mauer, for one reason or another, is unlikely to catch more than 110 games a year, so this is a serious need. Drew Butera is good behind the plate, but a black hole at it. I was counting on Jose Morales to be an upgrade on Mike Redmond, but for some reason Gardy finds him defensively deficient. It may be easier to improve Morales’s skills than to find anyone better via trade.

Home run power raises some interesting points about Delmon Young. He doubled his output from last year, and his 21 homers placed him behind only Jim Thome’s 25 on the Twins’ meager list. (The Blue Jays, by contrast, had seven players with 21 or more homers, led by Jose Bautista’s 54!) The Twins thought they were getting a power hitter when they traded Matt Garza to the Rays for Young, but it has taken three years for even his potential to show up. There is no chance the Twins will find another home-run hitter for next year. Valencia showed some power and could help. Morneau’s return to health would provide the biggest boost, and if Mauer could add just a tad more oomph, his warning-track drives would bring back his numbers of a year ago. If Bautista can go from 18 to 54 in one year, maybe the Twins’ best hope is for a similarly miraculous burst from, say, Cuddyer. What I wanted to say about Delmon Young, though, is this: for two years, we thought the Rays had gotten the better of that trade: Jason Bartlett has lasted much longer at shortstop in Tampa than Brendan Harris has in Minnesota, but they were the sideshow. Garza’s success on the mound, including in postseason, underlined Young’s underachievements before this year. But as we’ve just seen, the Twins have much greater need for power hitting than for pitching. Garza, this year, is not markedly better than any of the six Twins starters; they simply don’t need him. Young, on the other hand, led the Twins in rbi’s and is an immensely better hitter than anyone the Twins could replace him with in the outfield – see, e.g., Repko, above. So this trade should probably eventually go down as a win-win for both sides.

Finally, the above analysis omits this year’s principal DH, Jim Thome. Will he return? At one point he said, or implied, that if the Twins win the World Series, he could go out on top. Let’s hope that happens.

Instant Replay

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Very shortly after the Armando Gallarage/Jim Joyce unperfect-game situation occurred, I settled on the instant-replay solution that is being more and more talked about, and it is simply this:
Give each manager one challenge flag, but one flag only, that he can use at any point in the game for anything other than a ball-and-strike call.
First, challenges will be rare. Unlike football, with its fumbles, trapped passes and out-of-bounds steps, baseball has very few close calls that require a second look.
Second, if the manager is limited to one challenge, he will not use it unless it is at a significant juncture, and he will want to save it for the end of the game, when a call may be decisive.
Third, it will not delay the game. The rules should require that a challenge flag may only be thrown from the dugout before the manager has left it. Thus, it will replace what would otherwise often be a lengthy argument that is a real game-delayer. Similarly, the rules should state that it is an automatic ejection if a manager leaves the dugout after throwing the flag.
Fourth, there need be no confusion, as there is in the NFL, over what calls can be challenged. Any call that a replay shows to be clearly erroneous may be reversed. Through experience, a smart manager will learn which those calls are.
Fifth, human error will remain in the game. Old-timers who say, we’ve always lived with bad calls, they’re a part of the game, need not feel deprived. If the umpires make 100 calls in a game, only two can be challenged, leaving 98 possible errors to live with, not even counting balls and strikes.
So much for the objections. What is the upside? Quite simply, there is less chance that a game will be decided on an obviously wrong call, thus serving the demands of competitive justice. For the umpire, there is less chance that his name will live in infamy, a la Don Denkinger or Jim Joyce. For the fan, there is one more chance to second-guess the manager: should he have used his challenge there or not?
Baseball changes, not always for the better – look at the DH, interleague play, etc. Adding one instant reply would be relatively modest. I am ready, in fact, for something more drastic: a laser-defined strike zone. Why put up with umpires’ wildly inconsistent strike zones? Why stand for your favorite hitter’s being called out on a pitch six inches off the plate? Why should Joe Mauer’s strike zone be accorded more weight than a rookie’s? Look at how tennis has adapted, and survived, with “hawkeye” replacing linespersons on the service line. The game of baseball would be just as good, with a lot less whining, if we heard a beep, or saw a light go on, whenever the pitch passed through the strike zone. I don’t think the umpires union is quite ready, however.

The Save – Part 2

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After the Twins blew a four-run lead in the ninth inning Saturday night against the lowly Brewers, Star Tribune columnist Patrick Reusse astutely criticised Twins skipper Ron Gardenhire for managing for statistics. By that Reusse meant that if the lead had been three runs, Gardy would have brought in his closer, Jon Rauch, to pitch the 9th; but because the lead was four – and it was therefore not a “save” situation – he used the less dependable Ron Mahay, until Mahay had loaded the bases and the Twins turned to Rauch, unfortunately too late.
In any other situation, Gardenhire would bring in whichever reliever was best positioned to get the job done. Since the job here was closing the game, and Rauch is his closer and hadn’t pitched recently, Rauch was the logical choice. Except for the mindset that Gardenhire, like many other managers, won’t use his closer unless there is a save to be gained. But designating a three-run margin as a save situation is an arbitrary stat-driven determination – one that, like the closer role, didn’t exist for much of baseball history. In every other aspect I can think of, the game is played to win, and the statistics are compiled after the fact, and fall where they may. This is the only instance I can think of where an arbitrary statistic itself determines how the game is played.

O-Dog Paws the Ground

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A favorite moment from my first visit to the new Target Field came on Orlando Hudson’s first at-bat. I had heard he was loquacious, ebullient, effervescent and all the rest, but I had never witnessed him in person. He gave a love-pat to umpire Tim Tschida, then rubbed his hand over the head of Red Sox catcher Victor Martinez. Next, he methodically rubbed out every trace of the chalk line delineating the back of the batter’s box, which to that point hadn’t been touched. Finally, he brazenly planted his back foot well behind the line that was now missing its chalk. I don’t think Tschida said a word.
My other impression was a reaction against the common refrain that there isn’t a bad seat in the house. I can name one: Section 123, Row 27, Seat 11, the ticket I purchased, albeit for only $20, on the street. The problem is the overhang from the upper deck, which might be nice on a rainy day, but otherwise means you’re not sitting in the sun, you can’t follow the flight of fly balls, you can’t see the main scoreboard or the downtown skyline. There is a TV monitor, but at a day game it is backlit and hard to see. I also found I had to twist my body to watch home plate, a problem at the Metrodome that I thought would be ameliorated in the baseball-only park. The lines at concession stands were horrendous, largely due to inexperienced servers, and the hot dogs weren’t very good; but I’m hoping those problems can be rectified. As for the seats, I will try something different next time.

Twins Preview

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Before the first pitch of the 2010 season, I should make my predictions. First, however, is a resolution: to be patient. Last year was not the first time that I gave up on the Twins in midseason, only to have them ultimately win their division. I die a little with each loss, not accepting that 72 losses would still constitute a successful season. By the same token, I may despair of a player who is hitting .200 in April, only to find that he is among the league leaders by October. So, a hasty judge this year I will not be.

The Twins, remarkably, open the season with no rookies; so we should have a decent idea of what to expect. Except there are two areas of Unknown: 1., the middle infield, and 2. the closer. At short and second the Twins have brought in J.J. Hardy and Orlando Hudson. Both are Gold Glove winners and former All-Stars, which augurs well. But both fell out of favor with their teams last year, which is why they are Twins now. It would be nice, but wholly unlikely, for both to regain their All-Star form. More likely, one will have been replaced in the lineup before the season is over. The good news is that the players who would otherwise have started at these positions – Punto, Casilla, Tolbert – will still available. Third base is a perpetual issue, but I am content to have Punto and Harris to contend there, with Danny Valencia in the minors awaiting his turn. Both players will make the most of their opportunities, and neither is a sulker. Justin Morneau makes me nervous, only because his spring slump mirrors the late-season slumps he has produced the last two years. He can carry the team when he is hot, but I fear that more and more pitchers are learning his weak spot.

Young, Span and Cuddyer are set in the outfield, the only question being how much DH Kubel will sub in, and Mauer will catch. He isn’t the greatest clutch hitter I’ve seen, but it’s hard to argue with a .350 average and three batting titles in four years.

Which brings us to the closer. I haven’t been a Joe Nathan fan, although it’s also hard to argue with his record. For me, a dominant closer is Goose Gossage or Mariano Rivera, guys who give you no chance. Nathan let runners get on base, and his demeanor on the mound, the heavy breathing, made me nervous. But everyone knew his place, which let Gardy manage by the book, the way he likes. For now, Jon Rauch has been designated the closer. Few expected this, and fewer expect it to last all season. That’s okay, as many teams change, or find, closers in midstream. Two years ago, Jose Mijares looked like he had the stuff to be the closer of the future, but last year he couldn’t throw strikes to the first batter, which is a problem for a closer. Three years ago, Pat Neshek looked like a future closer. How well he comes back from arm surgery is still a question, but he has the temperament to close, which Mijares probably doesn’t, yet. Last year the best option looked like Francisco Liriano, who was devastating for two or three innings of each start, and then faltered. But he doesn’t want it, and to be a closer you’ve got to want it. Matt Guerrier has been mentioned, but to me he’s just steady, not dominant enough, and he tends to give up the long ball. My guess is that, unless Liriano flops as a starter and sees the light or Neshek comes back strong, the Twins will be in the market in July for one more reliever.

Will they win? If Baker, Slowey and Blackburn continue to improve and Pavano holds up, I’d say they should. Will I throw in the towel if they are not in first place in August? No. I promise.

The RBI

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In assessing a league’s MVP, no statistic is looked at more closely than the RBI: what wins games is runs, and he produces – i.e., drives in – the most runs must be the most valuable. But looked at more closely, the rbi, like many of baseball’s treasured stats, is somewhat suspect.
One, not all rbi’s are equal. The run batted in late in a close game surely should be valued more than an rbi in a blowout. Specific rbi situations could be assigned specific values – like the elements of a gymnastics floor exercise – but they aren’t.
Two, rbi opportunities are not spread around equally. Except for rbi’s via the homerun, they depend on having teammates already on the bases, preferably “in scoring position” – i.e., standing on second or third. The cleanup hitter usually leads his team in rbi’s, not only because he is inherently the best rbi-man, but because he typically bats after the teammates with the best on-base percentage. Statistically, he will have the greatest rbi opportunities on the team. A leadoff hitter, by contrast, will have the fewest, because he leads off the game and thereafter bats after the weakest-hitting teammates. A more accurate assessment of rbi value should require that the number of rbi’s be divided into the number of rbi opportunities presented. What that last figure itself should be is debatable, but let’s say it’s men-in-scoring-position for a start.
The above, of course, gets us into a bit of a chicken-and-egg debate. Is the cleanup hitter the team’s best rbi-man because he is the cleanup hitter? Or is he the team’s cleanup hitter because he is the best rbi-man? This will never be answered unless and until the stat is refined as suggested above.
P.S. The mention of “men-in-scoring-position” brings to mind a relatively new stat that has been prominently mentioned in connection with the Twins this year (2008), because they lead the majors in batting average with runners in scoring position (“risp”). The underlying basis for keeping such a figure is that, of course, runs win ballgames and hits with risp produce runs. Why this is not necessarily a valid assumption was illustrated, not for the first time, in yesterday’s Twins 6-4 loss to the Tigers. The Twins were 4-for-12 in risp situations, a healthy .333 average, well above their league-leading .311 mark. Of those 4 hits, though, one was Joe Mauer’s single in the first with two men on; the lead runner, Denard Span, was held at third. In the 9th, Alexi Casilla bunted safely, again with two men on. No run scored in that inning. The Twins, because of all their banjo hitters, undoubtedly also lead the league in hits with runners in scoring position that do not produce runs. Again, for this statistic to have real meaning, it should be tweaked, to reduce, if not eliminate, the value of hits that don’t produce runs.
The flip side of this statistic, of course, was shown in how the Tigers won the game: two homeruns with, in each case, a man on first. No hits with a runner in scoring postion, but four runs.
September 2008

The “Save”

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Among official baseball statistics there are a few pure ones, like batting average. Unlike rbi, batting average doesn’t depend on what the hitters ahead of you have done, nor, unlike runs scored, on what the hitters who follow do. It is also valid as a measure of worth: someone who hits .300 will be an asset to the team; someone who hits .225 will not. By contrast, a player can hit three home runs and still be valuable, or field at a .995 clip and still be a defensive liability. But among all the impure stats, one stands out because not only is it often invalid as a measure of worth, it alone affects how the game itself is played.

The “save,” first of all, didn’t exist until 1969. Baseball got along fine for all those years without it. It was introduced to acknowledge the increasing importance of the relief pitcher; but it, in turn, has itself increased that importance. Counting the number of saves has contributed to the mystique of “the closer.” As this mystique has grown, it has become legend that “the ninth inning belongs to the closer.” As a result, there are fewer complete games than in the old days. Once the starter reaches the ninth and a save situation develops, most managers will turn to their closer now, regardless of how well the starter performed in the eighth.

The next problem involves the definition of a “save.” If you enter the 9th with a three-run lead and finish the game with your team still ahead, you get a save, regardless of how well or poorly you pitched. If you give up three hits, two walks and two runs while recording only three outs, that would give you an ERA of 18.00 but you still get a save. Take another example: your team is leading by three runs in the 9th, there are two outs, there is a runner on first. You come in, throw one pitch, the batter drives it 400 feet to deep centerfield, where the ball is caught. You get a save, because the potential tying run was on deck when you entered the game. Or worse: the ball is not caught, but the runner is thrown out at home. You have thrown one pitch, given up a double and recorded a save.

On the other hand are the Mariano Riveras and Goose Gossages who enter the 9th with a one-run lead and strike out the side for their save. The wide disparity in the degree of difficulty for different save situations and the fact that a bad performance can reap the same statistical reward as the good performance are major flaws in the save category. Another obvious problem: you can only get a save when your team is ahead near game’s end. The closer for the New York Yankees has a major head start over the closer for the Washington Nationals (see, e.g., Rivera and Gossage, cited above, not to mention Sparky Lyle).

What bothers me most, however, is the way this statistic doesn’t just reflect the game, it affects the way the game is managed. To wit, Ron Gardenhire (and he’s just my local example) generally won’t put Joe Nathan in a game unless and until it’s a save situation. If the Twins are winning 5-2 at home with two out in the bottom of the 8th, Nathan will be warming in the bullpen, ready to come in. If a Twin then hits a home run, building the lead to 6-2, Gardy will sit Nathan down and bring in a lesser reliever. (Once two batters get on base, however, Nathan will be summoned.) The only magical difference in baseball terms between a three-run and a four-run lead is that one will produce the statistical oddity of a save, while the other will not, yet it has changed the manager’s choice of pitcher.

This is not to say that Rivera, Nathan and Jonathan Papelbon are not valuable to their respective teams. It is to say, though, that the difference between Rivera, who records his saves with cold-blooded efficiency, and Nathan, who produces heartburn as often as relief, is much greater than their number of saves will reflect. I am sure that the baseball stat-heads have come up with a closer efficiency rating that takes care of all the issues I have raised (just as SI informs me of a metric called Equivalent Baserunning Runs that measures baserunning value!). For starters, I would like to see a one-run save valued more highly than a cheap three-run save, with a two-run save in between. A closer is supposed to handle pressure, and there simply is much less pressure when you are ahead by three runs in the ninth. There also should be a penalty for allowing a run, let alone two runs, in a save situation – even to the extent of eliminating the save itself. Finally, the field should be leveled between the good and bad teams by ranking closers on their save percentage, not the save total.

Maybe the manager then would pay more attention to the quality of his closer’s performance and not be so automatic in how he deploys his forces. Even if it’s too late for that, at least the fans will be given an official statistic that, if not perfect, will be less impure.
August 2009

All-Star Thrills

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Another thrilling Major League All-Star Game – this one effectively decided when Ryan Howard struck out on a Joe Nathan slider in the dirt – calls to mind the superiority of baseball’s version over every other sport’s. “Superiority” is too mild a term, implying a meaningful comparison to be made, when in fact baseball’s All-Star Game is in a different league, just as the Oscars cannot really be compared to the Grammys.

            Why is this, when these are all exhibitions, and baseball’s manner of selecting its players is, if anything, more flawed than the other leagues’? For the last seven years, there has been a consequence attached to the game’s outcome: the winning league is accorded home-field advantage in the World Series. But that is at best of hypothetical importance to the players.

            No, the reason has to do with the nature of the sport. First, baseball, while a team game (as opposed to tennis and golf), consists of a series of individual confrontations, principally pitcher against batter. It’s mano-a-mano, not teamo-a-teamo. The batter’s success depends solely on his own skills, not the protection he gets from his line or the assist from his winger. He can perform to the utmost of his ability without having ever practiced with those playing around him. For examples last night, think of Joe Mauer’s line double to left; of Carl Crawford’s catch over the fence; of Albert Pujols’ diving stops; of Mariano Rivera’s total control of the ninth inning.

            Notice, also, that several of those examples involve defense. In no other sport’s all-star game does defense play the same role it does in the regular season. A hockey all-star score tends to be 7-6, instead of the more common 2-1. Basketball scores are generally in the 125 range. The unwritten rules of those games are, we’ll let you score if you let us score and we’ll just see who can score the most. The violence that is so much a part of a football defense goes aloha, by general consent, at that sport’s Pro Bowl. By contrast, last night’s 4-3 win for the American League bore all the hallmarks of a regular season, or even postseason, game.

            Defense can’t take a vacation in baseball; the sport just can’t be played that way. Even if an outfielder weren’t hardwired to make every effort to catch a fly ball hit his way, the fact that he is standing out in rightfield all by himself is a guarantee of good faith. Everyone is watching, from his peers to a national television audience. While a hitter can’t be judged from one at-bat (viz., Ryan Howard), because the pitcher he faces is such a variable, a fielder’s reputation can be made or lost in one play. And one play may be all he gets.

            In short, everyone on the field is playing his hardest, on both offense and defense. If victory is beyond the control of any one player, every player has pride at stake, and that may be the biggest motivator of all. They call it an exhibition, and everyone lauds the experience of it all. But what you do matters. Great plays at baseball’s All-Star Game are recalled for years to come. No other sport can say that.

You Can Assume a Double-Play

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Another shibboleth that distorts baseball statistics says that when one runner is retired on a batted ball and a second runner is safe only because a throw is off-target or is dropped, no error will be charged. This affects, and distorts, three different statistics. First, the fielder who makes the bad throw or drops the ball does not get a blemish on his fielding percentage. This is least important, because who really cares about fielding percentage unless there is something like a 150-game errorless streak at stake. Second, if another runner scores from third on the play, the batter will get credit for an rbi, which he wouldn’t if the double-play were completed. Third, and this is the big hit, the pitcher’s ERA will be responsible not only for the runner who is safe because of the errant play, but for all the runs that wouldn’t have scored had the second out been recorded.

Are these results just? No. If a first baseman drops a throw, it shouldn’t matter that an out has already been recorded. He is just as responsible for catching the ball, and if he fails, it should be his error. But maybe the second baseman who has to pivot in the face of an onrushing runner and relay to first shouldn’t be responsible if his resulting throw is off target. But hey, he is held responsible if his bad throw allows the batter to go to second. And some pivots are harder than others. The official scorer can surely identify when a bad throw is caused by the difficulty of the play, and when it is simply the fielder’s fault. This is the same judgment he makes on any hard shot or any slow roller that the fielder flubs.

From the batter’s point of view, if he is up with the bases loaded and hits a routine double-play grounder to short, whether he gets an rbi should not depend on whether the first baseman drops the relay throw. He didn’t do his job and he shouldn’t be rewarded. Conversely, the pitcher who does his job by inducing a double-play grounder that should end the inning shouldn’t be stuck with a lot of earned runs just because the first baseman drops a throw.

In short, to say “you can’t assume a double play” has no basis in logic or practice. Any error assumes that an out would have been made if the play was properly executed. Given the right circumstances – if the shortstop or second baseman has the time and space to get off a decent and timely throw to first – there is no reason not to assume the second out, as well.